Superannuation and Economic Inequality among Older Australians: Evidence from HILDA by Hodgson, Helen & Tapper, Alan
  
eJournal of Tax Research (2018) vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 236-265 
236 
 
 
 
 
Superannuation and economic inequality 
among older Australians: evidence from 
HILDA 
 
 
Helen Hodgson1 and Alan Tapper2 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article seeks to identify the effect that the current superannuation system has on economic inequality in later life. The 
analysis uses income and wealth data from the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey, 
collected between 2002 and 2014, to examine wealth inequality, which includes the balance of a superannuation accumulation 
account, and income inequality, which includes private pension income. The main findings are that inequality in superannuation 
holdings is considerably higher than wealth inequality among older Australians and that inequality increases with age, but 
overall the age pension and home ownership have had a moderating effect on income and wealth inequality over this period.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This article examines the extent of economic inequality among Australians over 55 
years of age, and seeks to identify the effect, if any, that the current superannuation 
system is having on economic inequality in later life. It examines inequality by reference 
to wealth, which includes the balance of a superannuation accumulation account, and 
by reference to income, which includes private pension income. It uses income and 
wealth data from the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) 
survey, collected between 2002 and 2014. 
Economic inequality encompasses income inequality and wealth inequality. Income 
inequality refers to the distribution of income across a given population. Wealth 
inequality is a measure of the distribution of net worth across a population. Wealth is 
concentrated among older age groups as it represents surplus earnings accumulated 
during working life. However, a significant proportion of this wealth is locked into non-
productive assets and so older Australians are frequently ‘asset rich but income poor’. 
Superannuation is represented in both income and wealth distributions. Superannuation 
accumulation funds form part of the wealth data. However, if the purpose of 
superannuation is to support a person in their retirement (Financial System Inquiry 
Panel, 2014), the asset must be converted to an income flow as an annuity or pension, 
and this income flow will appear in the income distribution data. 
The retirement income system in Australia is built on three pillars: the Age Pension; the 
Superannuation Guarantee; and other retirement savings. Saving through the 
superannuation system, whether mandatory or voluntary, is supported by tax 
concessions. Recent debate has highlighted the unequal distribution of superannuation, 
and the consequential unequal distribution of tax concessions (Australian Treasury, 
2015b, p. 90; Daley & Coates, 2015). 
Government policy in a number of areas will need to address the aging of the population: 
the age dependency ratio (the ratio of those age 65 and over to those aged 15 to 64) is 
expected to decrease from 4.5 in 2014-15 to 2.7 in 2054-55 (Australian Treasury, 
2015a). The extent of inequality among older Australians is important in designing 
policy in a number of core areas, including the age pension; health and aged care; 
housing; and—most importantly for this article—superannuation. 
A recent report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD, 2017), Preventing Ageing Unequally, highlights concern that modern 
economies are tending to increase economic inequality in general and amongst the 
elderly in particular. The report (OECD, 2017, p. 15) says: 
“Ageing unequally” refers to inequality that develops throughout the life course 
and materialises in old age. It is often the result of specific episodes during 
people’s lives that tend to cumulate their detrimental effects on health and 
income at old age. Ageing unequally is not a new phenomenon, but while the 
current generation of older people is experiencing higher incomes and lower 
poverty risks than previous ones in most countries, the younger generations are 
likely to face again higher inequality in old age. They are expected to live 
longer, but have been experiencing more unstable labour market conditions and 
widening inequalities in the distribution of earnings and household income. 
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The present study can be seen in this context as part of the necessary monitoring of 
inequality trends amongst the older population. It provides some benchmark data 
against which future trends can be measured. 
This article proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the state of economic inequality in 
Australia in recent years. Section 3 reviews the development of the superannuation 
system, identifying the significant reforms and when they occurred. Section 4 sets out 
the methodology we used in our examination of the effect of superannuation on 
inequality among older Australians. Section 5 details our findings. Finally in section 6 
we present our general conclusions and identify the implications of our analysis on the 
development of retirement income policy. 
2. INEQUALITY IN AUSTRALIA 
It is generally understood that income and wealth are each related to age but the two 
trajectories are importantly different. Income generally peaks in mid-life and falls in 
later life. Wealth rises with age more slowly than income and levels off or falls less 
sharply in later life. A typical life-cycle moves from an asset poor but income rich phase 
in early life to an income poor but asset rich phase in later life, with an income rich and 
asset rich phase in mid-life. The joint effect can be thought of as age-related economic 
well-being. 
There has been much recent debate over economic inequality trends globally (Keeley, 
2015; Piketty, 2014). The Australian data show that neither income nor wealth 
inequality overall is increasing in the period since 2000, although there does seem to be 
an increasing share of income and wealth at the top percentile level (Fenna & Tapper, 
2015; Leigh, 2013; Wilkins, 2015 and OECD data (OECD.Stat)). However, there has 
been little analysis of trends in inequality among older Australians as a subset of the 
population. Two very different questions arise here. One, are older Australians more or 
less economically equal than the general population? Two, is the trend amongst the 
older population tending to decrease or increase inequality? The second question is 
especially apposite given that the Australian superannuation system is shaping 
retirement wealth and incomes as it progressively evolves. These two questions are the 
focus of this article. 
3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUPERANNUATION SYSTEM 
Australia’s retirement income system is often described as being based on three pillars 
(Australia’s Future Tax System Review Panel (Henry Review), 2009). However, the 
World Bank framework takes a broader policy perspective, identifying five tiers (World 
Bank, 2008): 
1. a basic income safety net in retirement; 
2. contributory pensions; 
3. mandatory retirement savings schemes; 
4. self-provision, which may be encouraged through tax concessions; and 
5. a non-financial fourth pillar that includes housing and social services including 
health and aged care. 
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This extended framework acknowledges the importance of housing and social services 
in maintaining well-being into retirement. 
The three pillars formalised in the Australian retirement income system are the basic 
income safety net, mandatory retirement savings, and self-provision. Contributory 
pensions were rejected as a policy option in Australia in the first half of last century. In 
1972 the Hancock Inquiry recommended the introduction of earnings-related 
supplementary contributions to the age pension that could raise the pension to levels of 
around 30% of average weekly earnings (AWE) (National Superannuation Committee 
of Inquiry, 1976), but this proposal was rejected by the Fraser government. Accordingly 
the age pension is funded through general revenue and is not calculated by reference to 
pre-retirement income, occupation or contributions. In the Australian system self-
provision is encouraged through voluntary additions to the mandatory level of 
superannuation. 
Superannuation in Australia is often described as a maturing system. It has long been a 
feature of the Australian retirement income system, with schemes for white collar, 
public sector, and self-employed workers having been in place for many years; however 
by 1986 less than 40% of employees had superannuation coverage (Australian Treasury, 
2001). Superannuation has been supported as a savings retirement vehicle through the 
federal income taxation system since its introduction in 1915. The Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1915 allowed tax deductions for superannuation contributions paid by 
employers in respect of employees, and exempted the earnings of a superannuation 
fund, to the extent those earnings supported pension payments. 
Employees paid under award agreements were included in award-based schemes from 
1987 following the Accord Mark II agreement under which the unions deferred 3% of 
cost of living wage increases into superannuation: the precursor of the Superannuation 
Guarantee. The mandatory superannuation guarantee based on a proportion of employee 
earnings dates from only 1993, when it was introduced to provide ‘an equitable and 
attractive retirement income arrangement for ordinary Australians’ (Keating, 1991), 
with superannuation savings encouraged through favourable tax treatment. Notably, 
Keating did not envisage the mandatory superannuation as replacing the age pension, 
but a supplement that would maintain retirement income at around 30% of AWE. 
Superannuation guarantee contributions were initially set at 3%, increasing to 9% by 
2002. The first generation of workers to have had access to the superannuation guarantee 
for their entire working life will not begin to retire until around 2040. Accordingly a 
person who retired in 2002 will have been subject to the superannuation guarantee for 
nine years, at rates below 9% whereas a person who retired in 2014 will have 
accumulated significantly higher superannuation guarantee entitlements as they will 
have been covered for 21 years and contributions for half of that time will have been at 
9%. 
The next significant reform was in 2007. The ‘Simpler Super’ changes (Tax Laws 
Amendment (Simplified Superannuation) Act 2007) saw the exemption of pensions paid 
from superannuation fund earnings to a person over 60 and the introduction of generous 
contribution caps to replace reasonable benefit limits encourages contributions at a rate 
higher than that required to provide a comfortable level of income in retirement. 
Contributions to, and investment earnings of, superannuation funds have been taxed at 
a flat 15% rate since 1988. The tax rate applied to contributions is applied to 
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contributions from sources that have not been taxed, notably superannuation guarantee 
contributions and other voluntary contributions directly from salary (salary sacrifice 
contributions). As these contributions are taxed at a flat rate of 15%, where a person is 
paying a marginal tax rate that is over 15%, there is a tax advantage in diverting income 
into superannuation. However the second tax expenditure, 15% on the earnings of 
superannuation funds, creates a potentially greater opportunity to exploit the difference 
between personal marginal tax rates and the concessional tax rate paid by the 
superannuation fund. This arbitrage is increased when the fund goes into retirement 
phase as the earnings on assets set aside to provide a pension are exempt from income 
tax under section 295-385 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997.  
Superannuation funds are used to support the ‘self-provision’ retirement income pillar, 
allowing members to make contributions from other forms of savings. The concessional 
rate of tax creates incentives to use superannuation as an investment vehicle, an outcome 
that is specifically encouraged by the policy, but also encourages the use of 
superannuation accounts as a form of wealth creation rather than as a retirement product. 
Clearly some limitation on savings is an important part of superannuation policy. Prior 
to 2007 this was achieved by the application of reasonable benefit limits, which 
restricted the amount that could be withdrawn from superannuation at tax preferred 
rates. The reforms in 2007 simplified the system by removing maximum withdrawal 
limits but imposing caps on the amount that can be contributed to superannuation. 
However these caps were very generous, particularly in respect of non-concessional 
contributions (voluntary, post-tax contributions). This further encouraged the use of 
superannuation funds as a form of tax preferred savings. 
In this context, concern has been expressed regarding the tax expenditures associated 
with the current superannuation savings regime (Australian Council of Social Service 
(ACOSS), 2012; Australian Treasury, 2015b, p. 90; Daley & Coates, 2015). In 2015 it 
was estimated that more than half of the superannuation tax expenditures were received 
by the wealthiest 20% of Australians who have a greater capacity to save into 
superannuation (Daley & Coates, 2015). 
The most recent reforms, introduced with effect from 1 July 2017 (Treasury Laws 
Amendment (Fair and Sustainable Superannuation) Act 2016), addressed the escalating 
tax expenditures by reducing the contribution caps, and limiting the amount that can be 
held tax free in retirement phase. These reforms were introduced after 2014, and 
therefore are not reflected in the data analysed in this article. 
A key element of the superannuation guarantee system is portability of benefits, in 
contrast to earlier schemes that were linked to employer support. This encourages 
savings in accumulation type schemes, as opposed to defined benefit schemes. In 1982 
82% of superannuation funds were defined benefit funds, but by 2000 that percentage 
had dropped to 14%, with 86% being accumulation funds (Australian Treasury, 2001). 
An accumulation fund is defined as ‘a superannuation fund where your retirement 
benefit depends on the money put in by you and your employers and the investment 
return generated by the fund’.3 A member account in an accumulation scheme is 
recognised as an investment asset that is accessible after a condition of access has been 
                                                     
3 See Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), ‘Glossary – accumulation fund’, 
https://www.moneysmart.gov.au/glossary/a/accumulation-fund. 
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met, generally at retirement, death or upon reaching age 65. A retiree may draw on this 
as a lump sum or use it to generate an income stream as a pension or annuity. 
A minority of retirees are entitled to a pension from a defined benefit scheme, which is 
‘a super fund where your retirement benefits are calculated by a predetermined formula. 
Retirement benefits are usually calculated using your average salary over the last few 
years before you retire and the number of years you worked in the company or public 
service…’.4 These retirees are likely to be either former public sector workers and/or 
older retirees who were a member of a defined benefit fund before the changes 
consequential on the introduction of the superannuation guarantee. 
For the purposes of this study, which is examining wealth and income inequality, this 
raises questions over the relationship between superannuation as an asset and the 
resulting income stream. Superannuation as an asset is a factor in wealth inequality, but 
as an income stream it is reflected in income inequality. This limitation is also noted by 
the OECD when discussing the high income inequality rate among the elderly in 
Australia (OECD, 2017, p. 249). 
4. METHODOLOGY 
The article identifies and examines trends in inequality from 2002 to 2014 amongst 
Australians over the age of 55, using the Gini index and the P75:P25 ratio. The Gini 
index or Gini coefficient is an index of the inequality among values of a frequency 
distribution. A Gini coefficient of zero represents perfect equality, while a Gini 
coefficient of one represents perfect inequality. The P75:P25 ratio compares wealth or 
income at the 75th percentile with wealth or income at the 25th percentile of the 
population (with the 75th being the wealthier/richer). Both the Gini coefficient and the 
P75:P25 ratio can be applied to give an indication of the inequality of the distribution 
of wealth or income. 
The wealth module of the HILDA survey is released every four years, with data 
appearing in waves 2, 6, 10 and 14, collected in 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014. The time 
period examined in this article is based on these data waves. The sample size is 36,848 
observations over the four waves. For this analysis older Australians are grouped by age 
in five age bands: 55–59, 60–64, 65–69, 70–74, 75–79 and 80 and over. The resulting 
sample sizes are considered to be adequate for the level of analysis undertaken. 
All monetary data used in the analysis are adjusted to the consumer price index (CPI) 
in 2014 dollars. Where the data is household data it has been equivalised for household 
size using the modified OECD equivalence scales which assign a value of 1 to the 
household head, 0.5 to each additional adult member of the household and 0.3 to each 
child (aged under 15). 
The analysis uses both cross-sectional analysis and panel data to examine trends. The 
cross-sectional data provides a snapshot of the wealth and income of the participants at 
the time of the survey, and is used to examine changes across the survey population 
between each survey wave. Cross-sectional analysis is used to examine trends between 
age groups across the four waves of data. 
                                                     
4 See ASIC, ‘Glossary – defined benefit fund’, https://www.moneysmart.gov.au/glossary/d/defined-
benefit-fund. 
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HILDA panel data also allows analysis of changes between cohorts over time. As shown 
in Table 1, the panels are selected on the basis of their age at the commencement of the 
survey, but all reached retirement age during the period under review. 
 
Table 1: Selection of Panels for Analysis 
 2002 2006 2010 2014 
Panel 1 50–53 54–57 58–61 62–65 
Panel 2 54–57 58–61 62–65 66–69 
Panel 3 58–61 62–65 66–69 70–73 
Panel 4 62–65 66–69 70–73 74–77 
Panel 5 66–69 70–73 74–77 78–81 
Source: HILDA 2002–2014 
Panel data analysis is used to observe financial trends by following the panel of 
participants through the four waves of data, and comparing them to the data for other 
panels at the same age. 
5. FINDINGS 
5.1 Wealth inequality 
In the HILDA survey, net wealth is calculated as: the sum of (a) monetary wealth in 
bank accounts, superannuation, cash investments, shares, trust funds, and the cash-in 
value of life insurance policies, and (b) non-financial assets including the family home, 
other property, business assets, collectables, and vehicles, minus (c) debts comprising 
home debt, other property debt, credit card debt, HECS debt, other personal debt, loans 
from friends or relatives, and business debt. 
The first stage of analysis is based on cross-sectional analysis, and examines the wealth 
of the participants in each data wave who were in the specified age group. 
Our first finding (see Table 2) is that wealth inequality among Australians aged over 55 
is lower than that for the general population. 
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Table 2: Equivalent Household Net Wealth Distribution by Age, HILDA 2002–
2014, Gini Coefficients 
  
Age Cohort 55–59 60–64 65–69 70–74 75–79 80 and 
over 
All 
households  
D
at
a 
W
av
e 
2002 0.57 0.57 0.55 0.52 0.51 0.55 0.60 
2006 0.52 0.56 0.58 0.57 0.50 0.51 0.60 
2010 0.50 0.56 0.56 0.52 0.58 0.49 0.60 
2014 0.51 0.56 0.54 0.58 0.57 0.52 0.61 
Average 0.53 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.52 0.60 
 Source: HILDA 2002–2014 
In each of the older age groups there is some fluctuation in the figures over the four 
waves, with no clear trend emerging. However, wealth is consistently more equally 
distributed among the over-55s than among the general population. 
Chart 1 and Table 3, using the P75:P25 ratio, show that the spread of wealth has 
narrowed over the four waves of the survey in these age groups between 2002 and 2014. 
However, the trend over this period is generally U-shaped. Generally speaking, 
inequality fell after 2002 and rose after 2010. The lowest ratio was generally in either 
2006 or 2010, with the exception of the 60–64 age group in which the ratio fell between 
2010 and 2014 to the same level as in 2006, and the 70–74 age group in which the ratio 
rose consistently over this period. There is no clear reason that can be linked to the 
superannuation system that might explain this U-shaped pattern. 
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Chart 1: Household Net Wealth P75:P25 Ratio by Age: HILDA 2002–2014 
 
 
 
Table 3: Distribution of Household Equivalent Net Wealth by Age, 2002–2014, 
HILDA, P75:P25 Ratios 
 Age Cohort 55–59 60–64 65–69 70–74 75–79 80 and 
over 
D
at
a 
W
av
e 
2002 4.64 4.78 3.98 3.45 3.14 5.70 
2006 3.65 4.09 3.75 3.50 3.07 3.76 
2010 3.70 4.32 3.71 3.57 3.73 3.27 
2014 4.31 4.09 3.77 4.39 3.92 3.48 
Source: HILDA 2002–2014 
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5.1.1 Superannuation 
The relevant HILDA variables identify superannuation holdings as a component of 
household net worth. For superannuation holdings to be valued as an asset the 
superannuation must either be held as an accumulation account or the capital value of 
the retirement income stream must be able to be determined, as in a case where an 
annuity has been purchased. However, it is problematic to determine the capital value 
of a defined benefit scheme as such a scheme provides an income stream for life, based 
on factors determined at the time of retirement. Accordingly, the value of defined 
benefits will not be included in the wealth data. 
Table 4 shows the Gini coefficients for superannuation holdings among people aged 55 
and over. 
Table 4: Distribution of Household Equivalent Superannuation by Age, HILDA 
2002–2014, Gini Coefficients  
 
 Age Cohort 55–59 60–64 65–69 70–74 75–79 80 and over 
D
at
a 
W
av
e 
2002 0.67 0.72 0.81 0.87 0.90 0.89 
2006 0.67 0.68 0.76 0.81 0.87 0.89 
2010 0.61 0.71 0.75 0.79 0.88 0.90 
2014 0.59 0.68 0.73 0.78 0.85 0.91 
Source: HILDA 2002–2014 
Consistent with other analysis (Clare, 2014), we see that superannuation holdings are 
unequally distributed and that this inequality increases with age. However, there is also 
a reduction in inequality over time within each age group, with the exception of 
households with head aged 80 and over. 
In these age groups, superannuation holdings are more unequal than wealth in general, 
as can be seen in Table 5. (Here the net wealth and superannuation figures are non-
equivalised, and hence the Gini coefficients are slightly higher than those shown in 
Tables 2 and 3.) 
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Table 5: Comparison of Net Wealth Distribution with Superannuation 
Distribution by Age, HILDA 2002–2014, Gini Coefficients 
 
 Age 
Cohort 
55–59 60–64 65–69 70–74 75–79 80 and 
over 
 Asset Super Wealth Super Wealth Super Wealth Super Wealth Super Wealth Super Wealth 
D
at
a 
W
av
e 
2002 0.67 0.57 0.72 0.57 0.81 0.55 0.87 0.52 0.90 0.51 0.89 0.55 
2006 0.67 0.52 0.68 0.56 0.76 0.58 0.81 0.57 0.87 0.5 0.89 0.51 
2010 0.61 0.5 0.71 0.56 0.75 0.56 0.79 0.52 0.88 0.58 0.9 0.49 
2014 0.59 0.51 0.68 0.56 0.73 0.54 0.78 0.58 0.85 0.57 0.91 0.52 
Source: HILDA 2002–2014 
The finding that inequality in superannuation holdings is related to age in each wave is 
consistent with the maturing of the superannuation system outlined in the introduction. 
Older cohorts of retirees are likely to fall into one of two groups: in most cases they 
would have no superannuation coverage before the introduction of the superannuation 
guarantee in 1993, but a minority would have been a member of a pre-existing scheme. 
This dichotomy would result in higher levels of superannuation inequality among older 
age groups. 
The cross-sectional analysis also shows that inequality declined in each age group up to 
age 80 over the period from 2002 to 2014. This finding is also consistent with the 
maturing of the superannuation system as successive waves have accrued larger 
superannuation accounts through the application of the superannuation guarantee for 
longer periods of time. 
As shown in Table 6, the proportion of assets held in superannuation by each age group 
has increased considerably between data waves. Each wave shows that holdings 
decrease with age, consistent with retired people drawing down on their superannuation 
in retirement. However, the proportion of wealth held in superannuation by each age 
group has increased between each wave, consistent with savings being directed to 
superannuation prior to retirement. 
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Table 6: Proportion of Assets held in Superannuation by Age, HILDA 2002–2014 
D
a
ta
 W
a
v
e
 
Age Group 55–59 60–64 65–74 70–74 
2002 22% 17% 12% 8% 
2006 26% 22% 14% 11% 
2010 27% 25% 17% 11% 
2014 33% 28% 22% 17% 
Source: HILDA 2002–2014 
Although superannuation is increasing over time as a proportion of assets, it is still 
distributed more unequally than total wealth within the same age group, as was shown 
in Table 5. Therefore, we conclude that other assets must have a moderating effect on 
wealth inequality. 
5.1.2 Panel data analysis: superannuation 
Panel data analysis was used to examine financial asset holdings in more detail. Table 
1 provides details of the panels which were based on age in each wave of data. The 
panel analysis in Chart 2 shows several trends. 
The median balance held in superannuation is higher in the younger age groups, 
consistent with the maturation of the superannuation system. Superannuation balances 
decrease in the older age groups, consistent with withdrawals during retirement. 
However, the median balance of all financial assets, including superannuation, showed 
a similar increasing trend across panels. This is consistent with other research findings 
that older Australians are net savers (Cassells et al., 2015). 
Panel 3, those aged 58–61 in 2002, showed a higher level of financial assets in 2006, 
but also recorded a decline between 2006 and 2010, which corresponds to reaching 
retirement age (ages 62–65 for most workers) during the Global Financial Crisis. 
The panel data also show that the trend to reduce balances around the time of retirement 
is less pronounced in younger age panels: the median asset balance for panel 2 has 
levelled off when the age group reaches retirement age (ages 65–69). 
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Chart 2: Trends in Financial Assets by Panel, HILDA 2002–2014 
 
Source: HILDA 2002–2014 
5.1.3 The home 
Given that the level of inequality in superannuation holdings significantly exceeds the 
overall Gini coefficient, the data were then re-examined to identify other asset holdings 
that may have an equalising effect in later life. 
HILDA identifies the home as an asset separately from investment properties, and 
mortgages on the home are also recorded separately from mortgages on other property. 
The data in this analysis is based on the home and excludes investment properties. The 
net value of the home is the market value reduced by the mortgage attributable to the 
home. 
Consistent with the literature (Dockery et al., 2015, p. 58; Productivity Commission, 
2015b), we found that the most valuable asset held by most older Australians is the 
home. Home ownership levels among Australians aged 65 and over were 85.5% in 2014 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), 2015). Chart 3 shows that the net value of 
residential property increases as a proportion of net wealth until around age 70, at which 
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stage it levels off or decreases slightly. This reflects the reduction in housing debt among 
older age groups and the increased value of residential property relative to more liquid 
assets that will be consumed first in retirement. 
 
Chart 3: Net Value of the Home as a Per cent of Net Wealth by Age, HILDA 2002–
2014   
 
 Source: HILDA 2002–2014 
Table 7 shows the Gini coefficients for equivalent net housing assets by age. In general 
these are below the Gini scores for equivalent net wealth by age, as can be seen by 
comparing them with the findings in Table 8. 
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Table 7: Distribution of Equivalent Net Wealth in the Home by Age, HILDA 2002–
2014, Gini Coefficients 
 
 
 
55–59 60–64 65–69 70–74 75–79 80 and over 
2002 0.52 0.48 0.50 0.47 0.48 0.58 
2006 0.47 0.48 0.44 0.51 0.47 0.53 
2010 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.43 0.51 0.49 
2014 0.53 0.51 0.46 0.48 0.44 0.49 
Average 0.50 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.52 
Average for equivalent net wealth 0.53 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.54 
Source: HILDA 2002–2014 
Table 8: Comparison of Equivalent Net Wealth by Age with Equivalent Net 
Wealth in the Home by Age, HILDA 2002–2014, Gini Coefficients 
 
   55–59 60–64 65–69 
D
at
a 
W
av
e 
 
Home Wealth Home Wealth Home Wealth 
2002 0.52 0.57 0.48 0.57 0.50 0.55 
2006 0.47 0.52 0.48 0.56 0.44 0.58 
2010 0.48 0.5 0.48 0.56 0.48 0.56 
2014 0.53 0.51 0.51 0.56 0.46 0.54 
   70–74 75–794 80 and over 
D
at
a 
W
av
e 
 
Home Wealth Home Wealth Home Wealth 
2002 0.47 0.52 0.48 0.51 0.58 0.55 
2006 0.51 0.57 0.47 0.5 0.53 0.51 
2010 0.43 0.52 0.51 0.58 0.49 0.49 
2014 0.48 0.58 0.44 0.57 0.49 0.52 
Source: HILDA 2002–2014  
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ABS data (see Table 9) show that over this period the Residential Property Housing 
Index grew at a substantially faster rate than CPI and the increase in house prices was 
widespread despite regional variations in timing. 
 
Table 9: Increase in Residential Property House Index, ABS 
Increase from June quarters 2002–06 2006–10 2010–14 
Increase in Residential Property House Index: 8 capital 
cities 
31% 35% 11% 
CPI 12% 11% 10% 
Source: (ABS, Consumer Price Index, Cat. 6401.0; Residential Property Price Indexes, Cat. 
6416.0) 
Accordingly, the net value of residential housing moderated the unequal distribution of 
other assets, including superannuation accounts due to the high rates of home ownership 
in this age group and the widespread growth in the value of residential housing over this 
period.  
It must be noted that non-home owners have not benefited from this increase in the value 
of housing; and changes in debt ratios of home owners will also be reflected in net asset 
values. These factors would be reflected in inequality measures. 
5.2 Income inequality 
Turning to income inequality, we find that disposable income inequality is higher 
among older Australians than among the general population. Disposable income is 
private income plus government cash transfers minus income taxes. 
Based on the cross-sectional data we examined HILDA disposable income data from 
2002 to 2014. Table 10 shows the Gini coefficient for equivalent disposable income 
across all age groups from age 55. 
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Table 10: Equivalent Disposable Income Distribution by Age, HILDA 2002–2014, 
Gini Coefficients 
 
  Age 55–59 60–64 65–69 70–74 75–79 80 and 
over 
Total 
population 
aged 55 
and over 
D
at
a 
W
av
e 
2002 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.34 0.29 0.35 0.34 
2006 0.37 0.42 0.45 0.42 0.31 0.30 0.34 
2010 0.32 0.35 0.43 0.42 0.28 0.30 0.33 
2014 0.32 0.42 0.39 0.39 0.33 0.37 0.33 
Average 
2002-2014 
0.35 0.39 0.42 0.39 0.30 0.33 0.34 
Source: HILDA 2002–2014 
There is some change in inequality in the lower age groups which is difficult to explain 
by reference to policy changes. It is likely that this is related to the number of people in 
the sample that describe themselves as retired at each point in time. After retirement 
income declines significantly as employment income decreases and is only partially 
substituted by pension and investment income, therefore the difference in income 
between retired and employed respondents would be reflected in higher levels of 
inequality.5 
 
                                                     
5 Wilkins (2018, p. 33) comments on: 
…the high level of [disposable income] inequality among people aged 65 and over, and more 
particularly, the large increase in inequality between 2003 and 2008. Since 2008, the Gini 
coefficient for this age group has remained in excess of 0.34. Later retirement could potentially 
explain some of this rise, since a growing minority of the age group is not retired (and therefore 
receiving higher incomes). However, it may also be that growth in the number of retirees with 
significant superannuation holdings and other assets has increased inequality among this age 
group.  
This valuable study was received too late to be fully considered here. 
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Table 11: Proportion of Respondents Retired in Each Wave by Age, HILDA 2002–
2014 
 
D
a
ta
 W
a
v
e
 
Age 55–59 60–64 65–69 70–74 75–79 80 and 
over 
2002 31% 58% 79% 89% 93% 93% 
2006 25% 50% 78% 84% 92% 93% 
2010 19% 41% 73% 89% 90% 94% 
2014 19% 38% 69% 87% 93% 95% 
 Source: HILDA 2002–2014 
 
Table 11 shows a trend to deferred retirement, with fewer respondents taking retirement 
before age 65. Reasons for this would include the financial uncertainty created during 
the Global Financial Crisis, the increase in pension eligibility age for women and 
proposals to increase the pension eligibility age for men, although this change does not 
affect men born before 1956. 
We note that the findings in relation to disposable income do not take account of social 
transfers in kind, such as public expenditures on health and housing, or consumption 
taxes. The ABS measure of final income is more comprehensive: ‘household private 
income plus social assistance benefits in cash (e.g., age and disability support pensions, 
Family Tax Benefit) and social transfers in kind less income taxes and taxes on 
production (e.g., GST and taxes on alcohol and cigarettes)’.6 This is particularly 
significant in relation to older Australians as the value of government expenditure on 
health care received increases with age (Tapper & Phillimore, 2014). 
Table 12 shows the Gini coefficient for final income using ABS data. This is not directly 
comparable to the HILDA data, but it does show a lower level of income inequality by 
comparison with disposable income. In the older age groups this reduction of inequality 
is quite noteworthy. The trend over time is towards increased equality. 
 
  
                                                     
6 ABS, Household Income and Wealth, Australia, Cat. 6523. 
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Table 12: Distribution of Equivalent Final Income by Age, Gini coefficients, 2003–
04 and 2009–10, ABS 
 
 All 
households 
55–64 65–74 75+ Trend with Age 
2003–04 0.24 0.30 0.21 0.16 More equal 
2009–10 0.23 0.28 0.17 0.13 More Equal 
Trend over 
time 
More Equal More Equal More 
Equal 
More 
Equal 
 
Source: ABS (2012, microdata and calculations therefrom) 
The next stage of the inequality analysis examines the P75:P25 ratio to determine 
whether income is more evenly distributed across the population. In Table 13 the 
HILDA data are segmented into age groups. The trends can be examined over time and 
by age. 
 
 
Table 13: Equivalent Disposable Income Inequality Ratio: P75:P25, HILDA 2002–
2014 
 
  55–59 60–64 65–69 70–74 75–79 80+ Trend across age 
2002 2.62 2.76 2.29 1.93 2.05 1.79 More equal 
2006 2.31 2.53 2.39 1.99 1.90 1.87 More equal 
2010 2.00 2.33 2.30 1.95 1.76 1.88 More equal 
2014 2.11 2.48 2.17 2.02 1.94 1.78 More Equal 
Trend Across 
time 
 
More 
equal 
More 
equal 
More 
equal 
Less 
equal 
More 
equal 
Flat  
Source: HILDA 2002–2014 
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Overall, there are two trends evident in Table 13. Firstly, in each wave the P75:P25 ratio 
tends to decrease with age after age 60, although in 2002 there is an increase in the ratio 
between 70–74 year olds and 75–79 year olds. Secondly, within most age groups the 
P75:P25 ratio declined between 2002 and 2014. There was some volatility, with age 
groups other than 65–69 and over 80s reaching the lowest ratio in 2010 and moving 
upward to 2014, but with the exception of the 70–74 age group the overall trend is 
downward. 
5.2.1 Public transfers 
Although there are significant differences in salary and wage income, public transfers, 
in particular the Age Pension, tend to reduce inequality after Australians have retired. 
As income from salary and wages decreases as a proportion of total income, income 
from transfer payments increases. As shown in Table 14, in each wave the income 
received from transfer payments increased with age as a proportion of equivalent gross 
income. 
 
Table 14: Fraction of Disposable Income from Public Transfers by Age and Wave, 
HILDA 2002–2014 
 Age Groups 
Year 55–59 60–64 65–69 70–74 75–79 80+ 
2002 21.4 33.4 48.8 62.0 66.9 67.9 
2006 18.8 27.9 47.2 57.2 64.6 67.6 
2010 13.8 25.0 41.0 54.3 67.0 67.9 
2014 14.8 19.4 42.0 52.4 60.4 68.4 
Source: HILDA, 2002–2014 
Chart 4 illustrates the proportion of gross (pre-tax) income that is made up of private 
pension income and investment income relative to transfer payments. In all waves the 
proportion of investment income remains relatively stable. Private pension income is 
generally highest in the 65–69 age group, although in the 2014 wave there is a small 
increase from 17.7% to 18.3% in the 70–74 age group. 
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Chart 4: Sources of Gross Income (Excluding Salary and Wages) in each Wave by 
Age, HILDA 2002–2014 
 
Source: HILDA, 2002–2014 
Comparing age groups across the four waves, Chart 5 shows the proportion of income 
from transfer payments has generally decreased in each wave as a proportion of 
equivalent gross income in each age group up to the 75–79 year age group. The 
proportion of income from transfer payments is highest and most stable in the 80 years 
and over age group, with a relatively small overall decline in the 75–79 age group. The 
overall trend is down despite some fluctuation between 2006 and 2010 in the 75–79 age 
group and between 2010 and 2014 in the 55–59 and the 65–69 year age groups. 
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Chart 5: Sources of Gross Income (Excluding Salary and Wages) by Age, HILDA 
2002–2014  
 
Source: HILDA, 2002–2014 
Our analysis shows that the provision of the Age Pension has an equalising effect on the 
income of older Australians. The other two pillars of the retirement income system, 
private pensions and investments, contribute less than 30% of income in retirement for 
Australians aged 55. It must be noted that income classified as private pension income 
in the HILDA survey is defined more broadly than superannuation pensions, as it also 
includes payments received from workers compensation or disability insurance. Such 
payments are usually only payable until the recipient reaches age pension age at age 65. 
Among people aged 65 and over, the proportion of income reported from private 
pensions has increased over the duration of the study. There is a reduction in the 
proportion of income received from private pensions between 2002 and 2006 in the 75–
79 age group; and between 2006 and 2010 in the 80+ age group; however the trend is 
an increase between 2002 and 2014 in every age group. The age groups to receive the 
highest proportion of income from private pensions were the two middle age groups. 
The 65–69 age group received the highest proportion from 2002 to 2010, but in the 2014 
data wave the 70–74 age group received a slightly higher proportion. 
5.3 The top quintile 
Analysis by the Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA) (Clare, 
2015) shows that a small number of people have very high levels of superannuation 
savings. There is also evidence that more than half of superannuation tax expenditures 
are received by the wealthiest 20% of households (Daley & Coates, 2015) and that the 
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wealthiest 20% of Australian households own 75% of total household savings, including 
68% of superannuation assets (Cassells et al., 2015). Accordingly, the final analysis 
returns to the original question: what is the extent of inequality among older Australians, 
and what effect, if any, has the current superannuation system had on economic 
inequality between 2002 and 2014? 
Our analysis shows that superannuation is becoming slightly more equal, and that the 
effect of housing and the age pension provide a protective effect. 
Quintile analysis was applied to test this finding (see Charts 6 and 7 below). When mean 
wealth and disposable income are plotted against quintiles in the older age groups, the 
mean wealth and disposable income increase slightly across the first four quintiles, 
consistent with the protective effects conferred by relatively high home ownership 
levels and targeted access to the age pension. However, in the top quintile mean wealth 
and disposable income increase dramatically. 
The data also show that mean wealth and disposable income decrease with age: there is 
a reduction in both. For example in 2014 the mean income in the top quartile was 3.34 
times the mean income of the middle income for people aged 60–64, but this reduced 
to 3.26 for people aged over 80. The difference in net wealth is more significant at 4.57 
times for 60–64 year olds, down to 3.97 times for people aged over 80. 
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Chart 6: Quintile Analysis of Net Wealth for Certain Age Groups, HILDA, 2002-
2014 
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Chart 7: Quintile Analysis of Disposable Income for Certain Age Groups, HILDA, 
2002-2014 
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Source:  HILDA 2002–2014  
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Our examination of the HILDA data shows that trends in income and wealth inequality 
among older Australians have not changed significantly between 2002 and 2014. There 
has been some volatility in trends in inequality, which is likely to be attributable to 
prevailing global economic conditions that have affected the value of and return on 
investments that form the basis of superannuation investment portfolios, and for this 
reason it has not been possible to discern any changes in trends that can be directly 
related to the 2007 changes to superannuation policy. 
We have also noted that despite the overall levels of inequality among older Australians 
being stable, there is a significant disparity in wealth and income between the top 20% 
of the population and the remaining 80% of the population across all age groups, and 
this disparity is increasing. 
However inequality in superannuation holdings is considerably higher than wealth 
inequality among older Australians, and that inequality increases with age. This is 
consistent with the maturing superannuation system for three reasons:  
• the inequality in superannuation between the 40% of employees with 
superannuation coverage and those without coverage prior to the introduction 
of the superannuation guarantee would have persisted until retirement.  
• following retirement, as people draw on their superannuation accounts, those 
with lower balances will exhaust those balances more quickly, which would 
exacerbate the existing inequality; and 
• the data used to measure wealth inequality recognises the value of 
superannuation is an asset, which is more appropriate for accumulation funds 
than defined benefit funds. As noted earlier, pre-1986 superannuation funds 
were more likely to be defined benefit funds which would not be reflected in 
the data. 
As discussed in section 3, wealth inequality amongst the elderly is moderated by home 
ownership. This has important policy implications as there is evidence that home 
ownership rates are falling significantly among younger Australians (Wilkins, 2017, p. 
89). Levels of indebtedness are also increasing among Australians approaching 
retirement (Productivity Commission, 2015b, p. 75), with superannuation being 
accessed to retire that debt on retirement (Productivity Commission, 2015a, p. 46). As 
fewer Australians enter retirement owning a home, non-home owners will need to apply 
accumulated superannuation to the provision of housing, which will dilute the 
equalising effect of the superannuation system. 
Our study also shows that disposable income inequality among older Australians is 
higher than across the general population, but this is moderated by direct and indirect 
transfers. Older Australians are major beneficiaries of income support through the age 
pension in addition to health and aged care programs, which are not measured 
specifically in this study. 
6.1 Research limitations 
There are three limitations to note here. 
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First, as the inequality measures used are the Gini coefficient and the P75:P25 ratio, our 
findings are not informative about the outliers: the top 5% and the lowest 5% of the 
population. Regardless of whether the superannuation changes are reducing inequality 
among the population as a whole, policy measures need to address the circumstances of 
those in most need. 
Second, the data spanned the period of the Global Financial Crisis (2007-2009). To the 
extent that superannuation balances are affected by changes in the value of investments, 
this external shock will be reflected in the data. As growth in superannuation balances 
is a combination of investment growth and mandatory contributions, we have not been 
able to control for this factor. 
Third, the relationship between wealth inequality and income inequality is complex, and 
out of scope of this research. We do not know how closely the two forms of material 
well-being are correlated at the household level (OECD, 2017, p. 249). Superannuation 
assets are identified as wealth, but the purpose of superannuation is to support the 
conversion of this asset to an income stream. This relationship cannot be identified in 
the HILDA modules used in this project. 
6.2 Policy implications 
This study shows that as people age, reliance on the age pension becomes more 
universal (Chart 5), consistently making up more than 60% of the income of people over 
the age of 75. As access to the age pension becomes more tightly means tested, there is 
some concern among older Australians that access to the age pension will not be 
maintained, either through increased means testing or decreased rates of payment. This 
study addresses the period to 2014, so our data does not take account of the changes to 
means testing of the age pension that have occurred since that date, specifically the 2017 
changes to the thresholds and taper rates; or the more targeted 2015 changes to the 
assessment of certain private pensions. However, it does reinforce the importance of the 
age pension as the first pillar of the retirement income system. 
Our conclusion is that inequality is not increasing among older Australians, although 
the top 20% continues to hold a disproportionate share of both wealth and income. 
However, this takes account not only of the well-recognised three pillars of age pension, 
superannuation guarantee and voluntary savings, with tax preferences if saved into 
superannuation. It is also a function of housing and social services, which are 
incorporated in the extended World Bank framework. Threats to any of these will affect 
levels of inequality. 
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